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Young men today are significantly worse off than
their counterparts who entered the labor market in the
late 1960s. Starting wages for young men declined by
nearly 10 percent between the late 1960s and late
1980s. Even college graduates experienced some
decline in starting wages. 1 More importantly, the
evidence suggests that most workers did not make up
for the lost starting wages with higher wage growth. On
average, young men entering the labor market during
the late 1970s and 1980s experienced 15-20 percent
less wage growth over the first 10 years of their careers
than did young men who started working in the late
1960s. Furthermore, this overall decline was
accompanied by other changes in the distribution of
wage growth that appear to have exacerbated lifetime
inequality between young men with different levels of
education. Among cohorts that started working in the
late 1960s, workers with a high school education or less
experienced 68 percent wage growth over their first 10
years, while college graduates experienced 44 percent
wage growth, indicating that returns to experience
ameliorated inequality in starting wages among early
cohorts. By the early 1980s, however, wage growth
among college graduates had increased to between 50
and 60 percent, while wage growth among those with a
high school degree or less had declined to between 40
and 45 percent. Thus, among more recent cohorts,
changes in the returns to experience reinforce wage
disparities across education groups.
The decline in wage growth among young men has
important repercussions. Wage growth is one of the
primary determinants of lifetime income, and thus these
trends have the potential to impact life cycle decisions
such as educational attainment, marriage, and home
ownership. Moreover, lifetime earnings inequality
reflects permanent differences in access to resources
across individuals. Analysis of cross-sectional
earnings, the focus of many recent studies, cannot
provide information on this topic; in any given year, the
distribution of wages may be largely driven by
transitory shocks. Thus, by focusing on the structure of
wage levels in the cross section, previous studies have
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ignored an important economic trend of the last 30
years. Because wage growth (either by itself or
through its impact on lifetime earnings) affects so
many individual consumption and investment
decisions, understanding these trends is particularly
important for public policy. Many public programsranging from the Earned Income Tax Credit to job
placement services-focus on increasing employment
and CUlTent earnings, while ignoring long-term
considerations such as job mobility and wage growth.
In doing so, these programs neglect an important
incentive for individual behavior.
My dissertation documents the trends in wage
growth and explores the implications of the observed
changes, as well as possible factors that have
contributed to the trends. The first chapter examines
whether the decline in employment among low-skilled
young men since the late 1960s can be explained by the
decline in wage growth, which has reduced the value of
work considerably. The second chapter details the
increases in lifetime earnings inequality over the past
30 years and shows that they have been at least as great
as the much more widely studied increases in crosssectional inequality. Finally, the third chapter
investigates the extent to which skill-biased technical
change has been responsible for the observed changes
in the structure of wage growth.

CHAPTERl
LOOKING AHEAD: YOUNG MEN, WAGE
GROWTH, AND LABOR SUPPLY
The first chapter examines whether the changes in
wage growth described above can explain the decline in
employment among young men that has OCCUlTed over
the past 30 years. Much attention has been paid to the
salubrious effects of the CUlTent economic expansion
on the employment of young men (for example,
Freeman and Rodgers 1999). However, the present rate
of employment among young men still lags far behind
those attained during the late 1960s. Annual
participation (defined as the proportion of high school
dropouts with one to five years of experience who
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worked at least one week in a given year) declined 17
percent between 1967 and 1997, and annual
participation among high school graduates declined 5
percent. While past studies have attributed the drop to
declining wage levels or increases in unearned income
(e.g., Juhn 1992), this paper argues that young men are
forward-looking and take into consideration the
opportunity for future wage growth as well as current
wage levels in making their labor market choices.
Thus, the large decline in wage growth among low-skill
young men over the past 30 years is an overlooked
explanation for the downward trend in employment.
Distinguishing between the effects of changing
wage levels and changing wage growth is important.
The decline in participation represents a large loss in
productive capacity, and considerable resources are
allocated toward increasing the labor market
participation of young people through such
mechanisms as training programs and the Earned
Income Tax Credit. While these programs try to
improve wage levels, they often fail to take wage
growth into consideration and, as a result, neglect an
important work incentive.
The traditional static model of labor supply is
based on the assumption that the current wage level is a
sufficient statistic for the value of employment. This
model ignores the fact that employment also provides
work experience and concomitant wage growth. For
young people, wage growth is particularly high and,
because they have a long time to benefit, returns to
experience are likely to comprise a large part of the
value of current employment. As wage growth
changes, so too does the value of employment. A
simple two-period model of labor with endogenous
wages elucidates the way in which the labor supply
decisions of young workers depend on wage growth. In
the model, individuals maximize utility with respect to
consumption and hours of work in each period. The
wages of older workers (in the second period) are a
function of hours worked when young (the first period)
and an exogenous wage growth parameter. 2 Although
the equation for labor supply does not have a closed
form solution, I demonstrate that when the substitution
effect is greater than the income and intertemporal
substitution effects, an increase in wage growth induces
more work among the young. 3
Whether a change in wage growth actually affects
employment is ultimately an empirical question. Thus,
the next step is to estimate a model of labor supply in
which individuals take into consideration wage growth
as well as wage levels. Cohorts are defined by year of
entry into the labor market following the completion of
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schooling. There are four education groups: high
school dropouts, high school graduates, those with
some college, and college graduates. The estimation is
performed at the cohort level using artificial cohorts of
young men from the CPS.4 Due to sampling error, the
cohort means obtained from the CPS are only errorridden measures of the true cohort means. Therefore,
an error-in-variables approach is used (Browning,
Deaton, and Irish 1985; Deaton 1985). The resulting
cohort-level error terms are heteroskedastic, a problem
for which we correct. Two equations are estimated, an
annual participation equation and an equation of hours
of work conditional on positive participation.
The results show that indeed young men are
forward-looking in their labor supply decisions. A 10
percent increase in the return to experience increases
the annual participation rate by 0.6 percentage point
and annual hours conditional on positive employment
by 24 hours. As a point of comparison, a 10 percent
increase in hourly wages increases the annual
participation rate by 0.7 percentage point and annual
hours by 28 hours a year. Thus we see that expected
wage growth plays an important part in the labor supply
decision. Moreover, our model is able to predict 40
percent of the fall in annual participation among high
school dropouts between 1967 and 1977, a period of
decline that previous studies have had difficulty
explaining. In fact, if we hold wage growth constant at
the 1967 level but allow wages and the remaining
variables to vary, then we would actually expect to see a
slight increase in participation over this period,
suggesting that the decline in wage growth accounts for
all of the explained decline in participation.
As noted, the estimation described above assumes
that individuals have perfect foresight (or at least an
unbiased estimate) of their average cohort/education
group wage growth. This assumption was tested by
reestimating the model with several alternative
measures of expected wage growth. These include the
five-year lag of five-year wage growth (which is akin to
assuming that individuals take as their expected wage
growth the actual wage growth of similar individuals
five years ahead of them in the labor market); lO-year
cross-sectional wage growth (which represents the case
in which individuals expect to have the same wages in
10 years as similar individuals with 10 years more
experience at a given point in time); and actual wage
growth instrumented with cross-sectional wage growth
(which captures the intuition that people combine some
information about their own actual wage growth with
information available in the cross section). This last
measure performs the best. A 10 percent increase in
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expected wage growth increases annual participation by
2.3 percentage points and annual hours of work by (a
statistically insignificant) 23 hours. Thus, it seems that
young men do take into consideration some expectation
of their ex post wage growth.
This work makes several contributions to the
existing literature. First, it demonstrates empirically
the importance of forward-looking considerations in
the labor supply decisions of young men. Although this
issue has received considerable theoretical attention, it
is not often considered in applied research or public
policy. This suggests that policies aimed at increasing
the labor market participation of young workers, either
through training or the tax system, should take wage
growth into consideration. Second, the study
demonstrates that changes in wage growth are a key to
understanding changes in employment over time,
particularly among low-skilled young men. Past
studies, including that of Juhn (1992), have had
difficulty explaining the decline in labor market
participation during the 1970s and attributed it to a shift
in the labor supply curve. The results presented here
indicate that a large part of that shift can be explained
by changes in wage growth. There is also another
possible interpretation. Traditional labor supply
analysis plots participation against the wage. If instead
we plot participation against the present discounted
value of employment, then we can see the decline in
labor market activity over the 1970s as a movement
along this newly defined labor supply curve.
CHAPTER 2
LIFETIME INEQUALITY IS INCREASING TOO
The second chapter was prompted by the
possibility that the changing structure of wage growth
may have led to a decrease in lifetime earnings and an
increase in lifetime earnings inequality. While a vast
literature has explored the change in cross-sectional
earnings inequality, fewer studies have examined
changes in lifetime earnings inequality.5 However,
lifetime earnings are a better measure of individual
access to resources, and lifetime earnings inequality is
a better measure of the disparity in access. This chapter
thus begins to fill a significant gap in our understanding
of how the economic well-being of young men has
evolved over the past 30 years.
We begin by analyzing the decline in lifetime
earnings. Ten-year earnings, measured as the sum of
earnings over the first 10 years of work, declined
monotonically throughout the 30-year period.6
Cohorts that entered the labor market between 1967
and 1970 earned $270,770 over the first 10 years of

2001 Dissertation Summaries

their career. In contrast, those entering the labor market
in 1987 and 1988 earned $233,080-a loss of 14
percent, or $37,690. Of course, not all young men had
the same experience. High school dropouts
experienced a 33 percent decline in earnings, while
those with a college degree experienced almost no
decline. For all workers, declines in hourly wages
explain the majority of the loss of earnings, but for
workers with a high school degree or less, reductions in
hours of work also playa significant role, explaining at
least 70 percent of the decline in earnings during the
1970s and 20 percent of the decline during the 1980s.
The disparity in losses for workers with different
levels of education suggests that this overall decline in
lifetime earnings has been accompanied by an increase
in lifetime earnings inequality. An examination of the
lO-year skill premium shows this to be the case. For
instance, we find that whereas college graduates
entering the labor market in the late 1960s earned 2.6
times as much as their high school dropout compatriots
over the first 10 years of their career, those entering the
labor market in the late 1980s eamed 3.7 times as much
as the drop-outs over 10 years. The college graduate/
high school graduate lifetime earnings premium rose
from 1.57 to 2.0 over the same time period. These
increases in the lifetime earnings premium are greater
than the corresponding increases in the cross-sectional
earnings premium over the same time period.
Although the lifetime skill-premium can tell us on
average how groups are doing relative to one another, it
does not tell us what has happened overall to the
dispersion of earnings or the dispersion of eamings
within education groups. To answer these questions we
focus on a measure of inequality which is common in
the lifetime inequality literature: the coefficient of
variation (cf. Gittleman and Joyce 1996; Lillard 1977;
Parsons 1978).7 In order to calculate the coefficient of
variation, I use matched panels of the CPS, which track
individuals over a period of two years.8 The lO-year
coefficient of variation rose 30 percent, from 0.39 for
cohorts entering the labor market in the late 1960s to
approximately 0.52 for those starting to work in the
1980s. This rise in inequality is due to increases in
inequality both within and between education groups.
The increase in inequality within education groups was
in the range of 34-46 percent. It was highest for those
with a high school degree or some college education
and lower for high school dropouts and college
graduates. To put these trends in perspective, I
compare them with the changes in the coefficient of
variation of cross-sectional eamings for those with
1-10 years of experience. I find that the coefficient of
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variation of lO-year earnings rose faster than the crosssectional coefficient of variation, indicating that the
increases in cross-sectional inequality noted in previous
studies are not being offset over the life cycle, but
rather that a portion of the increase in cross-sectional
inequality is persistent. 9
It is also interesting to note that despite the large
decline in hours of work among low-skilled young
men, the increase in earnings inequality largely due to
an increase in the variance of wages. The coefficient of
variation of hourly wages increased by 25 percent on
average from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s. Young
men with low levels of education saw the largest
increases in the wage inequality. Overall, there has
been essentially no change in overall inequality of
annual hours. Within education groups, the changes
have also been small, on the order of 3-10 percent.
Furthermore, these changes do not suggest a strong
trend.

In summary, young men with a high school
education or less who entered the labor market during
the 1980s earned significantly less over the first 10
years of their careers than did cohorts that started
working in the late 1960s. They are also worse off
relative to their contemporaries with higher levels of
education. The findings suggest that the increase in
inequality observed in the cross section is not being
offset by increased mobility over the life cycle and thus
may require policy attention if it is to be ameliorated.
CHAPTER 3
1ECHNOLOGY, DEMOGRAPHY, AND
WAGE GROWTH
In this chapter, we explore possible explanations
for the observed trends in wage growth over the past 30
years. We focus on two likely candidates: the changing
relative supply of old and young, high- and low-skilled
workers, which has resulted from the baby boom, and
increased educational attainment and skill-biased
technical change. Since the 1960s, the U.S. labor force
has undergone dramatic changes. Between 1966 and
1981, the number of young men with one to five years
of work experience increased over 70 percent, from
slightly more than 13 million to nearly 23 million.
Moreover, these new workers were the most highly
educated in our nation's history. The number of young
people with a college degree increased by nearly 250
percent between 1966 and 1976.10 Numerous studies
at the time explored the impact of the large size and
high education level of the baby-boom cohorts on the
economic well-being of its members, and evidence
from these studies suggests that the large size of the
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baby boom generation did depress the wage levels of
the members. However, no effort has been made to
follow up that work and determine how their wage
growth was affected. The U.S. economy has also
experienced technological advances that may have
affected wage growth over time. If the bias of technical
change has differed for old and young workers, then
wage growth may have been affected as well. 11
To disentangle these possible stories, a translog
aggregate production function was estimated in which
old and young, high- and low-skill workers are treated
as separate inputs. 12 The production function also
allows for the possibility of skill-biased technical
change. Using the parameters estimated from this
model, we quantify the contribution of changes in the
size and composition of the labor force and changes in
technology to the trends in wage growth. 13
The results of the estimation are generally as
would be expected: all the own elasticities are negative.
Although no studies dis aggregate workers by both
experience and education, previous studies did
aggregate workers by either age or education. For the
most part, our elasticities have the same sign as earlier
estimates and are of comparable magnitude. The data
clearly reject the hypothesis of Hicks neutral technical
change. The conventional wisdom is that there has
been skill-biased technical change in favor of highskilled workers. Our data tell a somewhat more
complicated story. While there has been technical
change away from low-skilled workers, it has been born
entirely by older workers. The measure of skill-biased
technical change for low-skilled young workers is small
and statistically insignificant. Interestingly, there is no
evidence of skill-biased technical change toward older
high-skilled workers, while there has been a small but
statistically significant technical shift away from highskilled young workers.
Finally, we use the estimated parameters to
decompose the changes in wage growth (Table 1).
Low-skilled workers entering the labor market in 1979
experienced a 14 percentage point decrease in wage
growth relative to the 1969 cohort, while the more
recent cohort of high-skilled workers experienced an 8
percentage point increase in wage growth relative to the
earlier cohort. Our model predicts an 11 percentage
point decline in wage growth for low-skilled workers
and a 5 percentage point increase in wage growth for
high-skilled workers. Turning to the details, we find
that for low-skilled workers, technical change was the
driving force behind observed patterns of wage growth,
accounting for a 50 percentage point decline in wage
growth ceteris paribus. The reason is that technical
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Table 1 Decomposition of the Change in Wage Growth between the Cohort with 1-5 Years of Experience in
1969 and the Cohort with 1-5 Years of Experience in 1979
Low-skill

High-skill
Total

Total

Young
Old
(eOLj89*dlnXi89) (eYLj79*dlnXj79 ) (eYLj79 *dlnXj79)
-0.02
-0.15
-0.13

eOLj89*dlnXj89 )-

1) Own-effect
2) Technical
change effect

--0.57

Old

Young

(eOHj89*dlnXj89 ) (eYHj79 *dlnXj79)

(eOHj89*dlnXj89 )(eYHj79*dlnXj79)

--0.07

--0.17

0.10

--0.72

0.61

--0.07

-0.50

--0.12

0.99

1.25

-0.26

--0.09

0.95

-1.04

4) Cross-effect

-0.39

-1.06

0.67

0.21

--0.17

0.38

5) Total predicted
wage growth

-0.11

--0.01

--0.11

--0.07

--0.12

0.05

3) Capital effect

6) Actual wage
growth

--0.14

0.08

NOTE: The variable eijt represents the partial elasticities of factor price. The letter j indexes the four labor inputs, capital, and technology (time). dlnXjt is the change in the log quantity of factor j between times t and t-lO. Numbers may not add due to rounding.

change depressed the wages of more recent cohorts of
low-skilled old workers, while having little effect on
young low-skilled workers. The second most important
factor was the increase in the capital stock over this
period, which increased the wages of young workers
relative to old workers, thus decreasing wage growth by
about 26 percentage points. The largest countervailing
factor was the increase in the number of other types of
workers. Since it is easier to substitute away from
young low-skilled workers than old low-skilled
workers, the increase in alternative types of workers
depressed the wages of young workers by a greater
amount, steepening the wage profile.
For high-skilled workers, the increase in wage
growth was also largely due to technical change, which
was biased in such a way as to lower the wages of
young workers while leaving the wages of older
workers relatively unchanged. The increase in the
quantities of other types of workers also increased
wage growth, by significantly increasing the wages of
older workers who are complements with many other
types of labor, while lowering the wages of young
workers who are generally substitutes. The increase in
the capital stock was the largest factor working to lower
wage growth among high-skilled workers, by
increasing the relative wages of young high-skilled
workers. Although earlier research has made much of
the depressive effect of large own-cohort size on wage
levels, we find that the affect on wage growth was small
compared with other factors: it marginally depressed
the wage growth of low-skilled workers (since low-
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skilled workers were equally affected by their large
cohort size throughout their lives) and increased the
wage growth of high-skilled workers by 10 percentage
points, as the depressive effects of large cohort size on
high-skilled workers tended to dissipate over time.
This chapter takes an important step toward
identifying the aggregate trends behind the changes in
wage growth that have occurred over the past 30 years.
It also gives us some insight into how wage growth will
change in the future. Although future advances in
technology are difficult to predict, the demographic
changes facing the labor market in the next several
decades can be foretold as, barring a dramatic increase
in immigration. the potential workforce has already
been born. Ceteris paribus, the relatively small
generation that succeeded the baby boom is likely to
experience a convergence in the wage growth of highand low-skilled workers, while the members of the
"baby-boom echo" will again see the wage growth rates
of high-skilled workers outpace those of low-skilled
workers.· The paper also provides a basis for future
research using micro data. It would be of particular
interest to gain an understanding of why technical
change affects old and young workers with the same
level of education differently. The issue of why
technical change should be biased against high-skill
young workers seems especially important.
Taken together, these chapters have sought to
document and explain the implications that recent
economic changes have had on young workers
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throughout the early years of their careers. The most
important point is that for young workers with low
levels of education, not only wages but also wage
growth have declined, resulting in lower lifetime
earnings, higher lifetime eamings inequality, and, as
was shown in the first chapter, depressed labor market
participation. Public policies aimed at improving
outcomes for these young men must take into
consideration the long-term nature of the problem. The
chapters also make a methodological contribution by
refining methods for using repeated cross sections of
data and short panels to examine life-cycle issues. The
advantages of the CPS are also inherent in a number of
other datasets with similar structures, including the
Consumer Expenditure Survey, the Survey of
Consumer Finance and the Health and Retirement
Survey. Therefore, the methodologies employed in
these paper have a potentially great range of uses.
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11.

NOTES

This summary is from the author's doctoral dissertation at
Columbia University; her advisor was Stephen Cameron. Dr.
Aaronson is now with the Federal Reserve Board.
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1. All calculations are the author's based on the 1968-1998

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
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March Demographic Supplements to the Current
Population survey (CPS), which refer to the years 19671997.
The source of wage growth in this model may derive from
any number of sources, including (but not limited to)
returns to experience, learning about the quality of a job
march, or the back-loading for wages, as long as it is
conditional on prior work experience.
Some of this same intuition can be found in the emphical
results of Shaw (1989) and Wolpin (1992), although the
methodology of those papers is very different from the
work presented here.
Although there are several panel data sets which could
have been used for much of the analysis presented here,
the CPS has several advantages. At least 30 years of data
are available, allowing for an exploration of the trends in
employment over thne. Furthermore, the large sample
sizes allow for more detailed analysis of subsamples of
the population. The advantages of the CPS are discussed
in greater detail in the first two chapters of the
dissertation.
Exceptions include Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock
(1998), Haider (1998), and Gittleman and Joyce (1996).
A number of studies have exarnined the related issue of
mobility, including Moffit and Gottschalk (1995) and
Buchinsky and Hunt (1996).
We choose to follow the men for 10 years because by that
time they will have experienced most of the wage growth
that will occur over their careers (Murphy and Welch
1990). Choosing a longer thne period would reduce the
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number of cohorts we observe without adding much
information on earnings.
The dissertation includes a complete discussion of the
relative merits of using the coefficient of variation to
measure earnings inequality.
For an overview of the matched CPS, see Peracchi and
Welch (1995).
Evidence of the increase in the variance of the persistent
component of the earnings has been presented by
Cameron and Tracy (1998), among others.
During this time there was also a dramatic increase in the
number and proportion of women participating in the
labor force. In this study we do not isolate the effect of
the increase in female labor force participation, although
we do attempt to control for the change in the
composition of the workforce that results from their
higher rates of participation.
Another possible explanation for the change in wage
growth is a change in cohort quality. This issue is
discussed more fully in the dissertation. Although we do
not account for shifts in within-group quality, we do
attempt to account for changes in cohort quality that
might have occurred as a result of the changing
composition of the labor force.
Low-skilled workers are all those with less than a college
degree, while high-skilled workers have at least a college
degree. "Young" workers are in the first five years of
post-schooling work experience. All other workers are
considered "old." A finer breakdown of workers was not
possible due to data limitations. Although these are very
broad groupings and do not correspond precisely to the
definitions used in the earlier chapters, nonetheless, the
same basic trends in wage growth are apparent.
Previous studies, notably Heckman, Lochner, and Taber
1998 and MaCurdy and Mroz 1995, have examined
changes in wage growth over time, but the approaches
differed significantly from the one pursued here and they
did not attempt to decompose the underlying causes for
the trends.
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